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The Impact of Graduate Mobility on Human Capital Inequalities and Regional Performance

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



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





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

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Outline

- Human capital and economic growth in nations and regions
- Individual benefits from investments in education
- Mismatch, education versus skills
- Human capital and migration
- Labour market behaviour of higher educated graduates
- Human capital spill overs at the personal and regional level
- Conclusions and policy implications










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The individual benefits of investing in human capital

- Human Capital Theory (Sjaastad, 1962) and Job Search Theory (Lippman and McCall, 1976, 1979 and Pissarides, 1976): higher educated have higher wages, lower risks of unemployment; but also better health, higher life expectancy
- Higher educated are more spatially mobile because they have lower (information and psychic) cost and higher returns in terms of future wages. Path-dependency: if they move once, they are more likely to move again: onward moves versus return moves
- In- and outflows of migration are highly correlated: but destination choice has mixed relations with regional differences in wages and unemployment (e.g. Lowry, 1966). Regional differences in cultural and natural amenities and quality of life may also play a role (e.g. Graves, 1980)



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

Mismatch: what are we talking about?

- Over/under schooling
- Over/under qualified
- Over/under skilled
- Over/under abilities
- Objective – Subjective
- Horizontal - Vertical

Source: CEDEFOP, The skill matching Challenge - Analysing skill mismatch and policy implications Luxembourg: EU Publications Office of the European Union, 2010

Table 1. Glossary of terms

Overeducation	A situation in which an individual has more education than the current job requires (measured in years)
Undereducation	A situation in which an individual has less education than the current job requires (measured in years)
Overqualification	A situation in which an individual has a higher qualification than the current job requires
Underqualification	A situation in which an individual has a lower qualification than the current job requires
Over-skilling	A situation in which an individual is not able to fully utilize his or her skills and abilities in the current job
Under-skilling	A situation in which an individual lacks the skills and abilities necessary to perform in the current job
Overeducation	A situation in which the level of education required to obtain the job exceeds the level of education required to perform the job adequately in order to gain a level of the employee that the possession of certificates and diplomas results in higher productivity on the part of the individual
Undereducation	A situation in which an individual possesses more education than the current job requires and also in which current skills and abilities are underutilized
Formal overeducation	A situation in which an individual possesses more education than the current job requires, but in which currently used skills are fully utilized
Formal undereducation	A situation in which an individual has more education than the current job requires and this does not have a negative effect on the level of job utilization
Apparent overeducation	A situation in which an individual has more education than the current job requires, but this does not necessarily affect the level of job utilization
Apparent undereducation	A situation in which an individual has less education than the current job requires, but this does not necessarily affect the level of job utilization
Skill shortage	A situation in which the supply of available people with particular skills does not match the demand for it
Skill surplus	A situation in which the supply of available people with particular skills exceeds the demand for it
Skill gap	A situation in which the level of skills of the currently employed is less than that required to perform the job adequately in the type of skill that does not match the requirements of the job
Excessive skills development	A situation in which skills primarily obtained in a job are no longer required or have diminished in importance
Physical mismatch	Physical or mental skills and abilities demanded that do not match or wear out too fast
Vertical mismatch	A situation in which the level of education or skills is less or more than the required level of education or skills
Horizontal mismatch	A situation in which the level of education or skills matches job requirements, but the type of education or skills is inappropriate for the current job
Subjective measure of mismatch	The mismatch estimate is obtained by self assessment by employees in a questionnaire
Objective measure of mismatch	The mismatch estimate is obtained by matching job requirements
Overeducation indicator	The mismatch estimate is obtained from differences in the actual education of an individual and the minimum education to obtain a certain level of education of all employees in that occupation (where there are no data on mismatch obtained from other of the above methods)
Undereducation indicator	Other other qualified workers are hired in jobs that have qualified workers could do it. The percentage of all the qualified workers that are employed in the required occupation is calculated for the job. The percentage of all the qualified workers that are employed in the required occupation is calculated for the job. The percentage of all the qualified workers that are employed in the required occupation is calculated for the job.
Over-skilling indicator	The mismatch estimate is obtained by self assessment by employees in a questionnaire
Under-skilling indicator	The mismatch estimate is obtained by self assessment by employees in a questionnaire
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Under-skilling indicator	The mismatch estimate is obtained by self assessment by employees in a questionnaire



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Cost and consequences of skill mismatch

Table 3: Costs and consequences of skill mismatch

	Individuals	Employers	Society
Direct costs	loss of earnings	higher recruitment costs	unemployment benefits
	higher turnover and absenteeism	lower productivity	public expenses for training and other ALMPs
		lower product quality	
Indirect, long-run and non-monetary costs	loss of skills/skill obsolescence	higher turnover costs	under-investment in training
	loss of self-confidence	higher skilled workers' wages	low-skills-bad jobs-low wages equilibrium
	lower levels of trust in government	higher turnover costs	higher equilibrium/structural unemployment
	lower job satisfaction	lower innovation capacity	loss of potential output and employment
	lower participation in training	lower competitiveness	lower long-run growth


Source: Cedefop review of available literature on skill mismatch.

But is overeducation also bad from the regional perspective?


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Migration of human capital and regional growth


- > **Neo-classical theory:** migrants move from regions with low wages and high unemployment to regions with high wages and low unemployment → regional differences will narrow (equilibrium)
- > **Cumulative causation:** high wage regions attract high skilled migrants leading to an increase in effective internal regional demand → greater knowledge activities and investments and results in increasing regional disparities
- > **Escalator model:** large gross flows of young high educated migrants (university graduates) enter particular locations to replace older workers with other residential preferences, leading to a constant human capital churn of new, ideas, knowledge and skills. Driven by intergenerational and life-cycle features, spatial effects can be diverse.
- > **Policy perspective: is in- or out-migration good or bad? Mixed ideas.**




Graduate Migration Behaviour in the Netherlands using longitudinal (25 years) micro data



Migration patterns of youngsters





Education index population 15-64 year





Growing cities in a shrinking surrounding region:

The escalator-model

→ redistribution of human capital mainly within, but also between regions!





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Brain drain / brain gain: conclusions

- Research question:
 - Where do students come from and where are they going to live and work after graduation?
 - Does this pattern shows variation by discipline and regional labour market conditions?
- Data and analysis: micro data (1999-2007) / regression analysis
- Conclusions:
 - The region loses, the city wins and in the end especially Amsterdam
 - Bonding is important, mobility is only high around the graduation date. Many stay put.
 - Considerable regional differences in the way they serve their own labour market
 - Periphery doesn't lose automatically the best students, except for economists and lawyers. Is this a problem? Brain drain or clean export product?
 - Migration is paying-off, but not for all (self-selection.)
 - Job opportunities are more important for migration than residential amenities

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Human Capital Externalities: Effects for Low Educated Workers and Low Skilled Jobs

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Regional Studies, 2014

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Relevant externalities and related literature

- Regional or firm level externalities to education: private vs. social rate of return to education / Rauch (1993) Blundell et al. (1999) Moretti (2004a) Canton (2009)
- Urban level externalities of education: Urban Wage Premium / Moretti (2004b) Heuerman et al (2010)
- Production vs. consumption externalities to education: Learning spill-overs vs. expenditure spill-overs / Lucas (1988) vs. Sassen (2001)
- Proximity of low and high skilled at the firm level: Learning spill-overs / Lucas (1988); Horndal effect / Malmberg et al. (2008)

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Methodology (1)

$$\log(w_{i,f,r,t}) = \alpha + X_{i,f,r,t}\beta + Y_{f,r,t}\gamma + Z_{r,t}\delta + \varepsilon_{i,f,r,t}$$

- $w_{i,f,t}$ is the hourly wage rate of individual i , working in firm f , which is located in region r , at time t .
- X is a vector of employee characteristics, like:
 - gender
 - working hours
 - human capital (HC) → private rate of return to education
- Y is a vector of firm characteristics, like:
 - industry
 - size
 - Human Capital firm level → production externalities → social rate of return
 - Distribution low vs. high skilled → production externalities → social rate of return
 - McDonalds type of firm (mostly low skilled) versus Microsoft type of firm high skilled

Methodology (2)

4. Z is the vector of **regional characteristics**, like
 - Urbanisation, Unemployment
 - Human Capital of persons working in region outside firm → **production externality**, part of social rate of return to education
 - Human Capital of persons living in region → **consumption externality** part of social rate of return to education
5. The residuals are represented by ε , α represents the intercept (including fixed effects), β , γ and δ are effect parameters.
6. We can distinguish between **educational level of the workers and the skill level of jobs**

Data

- Matched Employer-Employee dataset over 1995-2007. Source: Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, Working Conditions Survey (WCS)
- Sample of firms in which a stratified sample of employees is drawn, each annual wave approx. 27.000 employees in approx. 2000 firms
- No panel, but a repeated cross-section
- Rich set of background characteristics of individual employees and firms (gender, working hours, wages, work experience, education, occupational skills, industry, firm size, firm location)
- WCS is based on work location (2-digit zip-code, 90 small regions). WCS is augmented with data on HC of workers living in these 2-digit zip-codes. Latter yields consumption externalities

Results: Human Capital Externalities: all employees

Dependent variable	Model	Log of hourly wage rate				
		1	2	3	4	5
Level of education	Education level of individual	0.081**	0.077**	0.081**	0.081**	0.077**
	Average Education level in region	0.008**			0.002**	
	Average Education workers in firm		0.011**			0.011**
	Average Education regional workers excl. firm		0.002			-0.003
	Average Education regional inhabitants 15-64			0.029**	0.027**	0.027**
Properties workers	Experience	0.047**	0.047**	0.047**	0.047**	0.047**
	Experience squared	-7.5E-04**	-7.5E-04**	-7.5E-04**	-7.5E-04**	-7.5E-04**
	Female	-0.063**	-0.065**	-0.064**	-0.064**	-0.066**
	Part-time	0.247**	0.242**	0.247**	0.246**	0.242**
Properties region	Population density	1.9E-05**	1.9E-05**	1.7E-05**	1.7E-05**	1.7E-05**
	Regional unemployment	-0.821**	-0.810**	-0.722**	-0.723**	-0.712**
	Number of variables	38	39	38	39	40
	Number of observations	368,541	368,439	368,541	368,541	368,439
	R ²	0.760	0.761	0.761	0.761	0.762

All specifications include also the following control variables: industry dummies, firm size dummies, year fixed effect dummies.

Conclusion for the analysis on all employees

- Human capital (HC) stock is years of education
- Private net rate of return to education: **8%**
- Social net rate of return to education: **3.8%** of which:
 - production externalities of education at the firm: 1.1%
 - production externalities of education in the region: 0.0%
 - consumption externalities of education in the region: 2.7%

Results: Human Capital Externalities: low educated / low skilled

Dependent variable: log of hourly wage rate	employees with low education		employees on low skilled jobs		
	coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	
Level of education	Education of individual	0.033**	0.033**	0.032**	0.035**
	Average education workers in firm	0.020**	0.020**	0.016**	0.003**
	Average education regional workers excl. in firm	-0.001	-0.001	1.9E-04	-2.8E-04
	Average education regional inhabitants aged 15-64	0.019**	0.019**	0.025**	0.023**
Properties workers	Experience	0.049**	0.049**	0.048**	0.048**
	Experience squared	-7.8E-04**	-7.8E-04**	-8.1E-04**	-8.1E-04**
	Female	-0.064**	-0.064**	-0.028**	-0.028**
	Part-time	0.234**	0.234**	0.204**	0.198**
Properties region	Population density	1.3E-05**	1.3E-05**	1.4E-05**	1.3E-05**
	Regional unemployment	-0.430**	-0.430**	-0.491**	-0.447**
Distribution education at firm-level	low and high educated workers		0.001		
	low vs. high plus scientifically skilled jobs				-0.077**
	Number of variables	40	41	40	41
	Number of observations	188,532	188,532	131,773	131,773
	R ²	0.766	0.766	0.765	0.766

All specifications include also the following control variables: industry dummies, firm size dummies, year fixed effect dummies.

Conclusion for the analysis for low educated, low skilled jobs

- Private net rate of return to education for low educated / low skilled jobs substantially lower: **3.2 - 3.5%**
- For **low educated** the Social net rate of return is: **4.0%**
 - production externalities at the firm: 2.0%
 - production externalities in the region: 0.1%
 - consumption externalities in the region: 1.9%
 - No effect of distribution of education within firm 0.0%
- For **low skilled jobs** the Social net rate of return is: **4.1%**
 - production externalities at the firm: 1.6%
 - production externalities in the region: 0.0%
 - consumption externalities in the region: 2.5%
 - **But large effect of distribution of education within Microsoft type firm of 7.7%!**



Overall conclusions effect of Human Capital Externalities

- › An additional year of schooling increases the wage rate of average employees with 8% and for low educated / low skilled with 3% → improve position low skilled by increase in individual education
- › Social returns HCE's are about 4% and the same for all employees and low educated.
- › At the regional level consumption spill overs are significant and more or less equal for all employees, low educated and low skilled jobs.
- › Production/learning spill overs are not significant at the regional level, these take place at the firm level. These effects are larger for low educated workers
- › Those with low skilled jobs in firms with many high skilled jobs realize a substantial higher wage: → proximity to many high skilled improves position of workers on low skilled jobs



Human capital and regional economic growth

- › Endogenous growth models → accumulation of knowledge (Romer, 1990) and of human capital (Lucas, 1988) leads to higher growth rates in terms of GDP and employment. For countries this is true, but empirical evidence for regions is inconclusive.
- › Possible explanations: the 'openness' of regions and the high spatial mobility of higher educated; and also: the measurement of human capital stock (years of education, spendings on education), education versus skills, vertical and horizontal mismatch, over- and under-education, migration of human capital (brain drain versus brain gain)
- › Re-allocation of human capital does not necessary lead to reduced interregional disparities as neo-classical theory predicts, instead 'cumulative causation' or the escalator model is more likely to happen at the regional level (Van Dijk et al.1989)



Conclusions and policy implications

- › Higher educated graduates are the most spatially mobile group in the labour market, especially in the years before and after graduation. But most of them stay in the home region.
- › It leads to a redistribution of human capital within regions, but also between regions; impacts on regions are complex processes
- › **If they leave:** brain drain or clean export product?
- › **If they stay:** underutilization of human capital investment or beneficial for the region due to positive production and consumption externalities of which also low educated benefit?
- › **Policy implication:** stimulate private and public investment in education because it is beneficial both for individuals and regions



Thank you for your attention

